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ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS  
AND FREE SPEECH:  
TOWARD A CONSISTENT  
CONTENT NEUTRALITY STANDARD 
FOR OUTDOOR SIGN REGULATION 
Brian J. Connolly* 
First Amendment challenges by billboard companies and other sign owners to 
local sign regulations have become a frequent occurrence in the past thirty years. 
The stakes are high for both commercial sign owners and local governments. Sign 
control has emerged as an important front in the environmental protection 
movement, as it focuses on the visual or scenic quality of the environment. Courts 
have begun to recognize and accept local governments’ interest in controlling the 
proliferation of signage as part of their efforts to improve environmental quality, 
but courts have applied First Amendment doctrine in an inconsistent manner. 
The courts’ inconsistent treatment of the constitutional requirement of content 
neutrality has undermined state and local efforts to maintain aesthetic environ-
ments free from noxious signage. One of the consequences of this inconsistency is a 
false sense of security among sign regulators that their content-based regulations 
are somehow consistent with the First Amendment. 
This Note argues in favor of a strict approach to content neutrality, placing a 
greater burden on sign regulators to develop the most content-neutral ordinances 
possible. The proposed approach would beat billboard companies and sign owners 
at their own litigation game, limiting governments’ exposure to litigation and 
lessening the risk of sign regulations being invalidated, which in turn denigrates 
aesthetic quality. Furthermore, the recommended approach would reaffirm the 
First Amendment rights of sign owners while ensuring that regulatory bodies 






                                                                                                                      
 * J.D. Candidate, December 2012. Special thanks are owed to University of Michi-
gan professors Don Herzog and Noah Hall for their assistance on this Note, and to fellow 
University of Michigan Law School student Maggie Mettler for her review and comments. 
Connolly_Final_WEB 1/22/2013  1:44 PM 
186 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 186 
 I. SIGN REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
A BRIEF HISTORY ................................................................ 190 
A. Aesthetic Regulation ............................................................... 190 
B. First Amendment and Content Neutrality ................................. 191 
C. Collision of Aesthetics and the First Amendment:  
Metromedia ........................................................................ 194 
 II. CRACKS IN THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE ............. 197 
A. The Functional Approach ....................................................... 198 
B. The Strict Content-Neutral Approach ...................................... 200 
 III. DOCTRINAL DEMANDS FOR THE  
STRICT CONTENT-NEUTRAL APPROACH .............................. 203 
A. Precedent and the Broadening Scope of Content Neutrality ......... 203 
B. Carve-outs from the Content Neutrality Doctrine:  
False Alarms ......................................................................... 209 
1. Unprotected Speech: Obscenity and Fighting Words ... 209 
2. Metromedia Distinctions ............................................... 210 
C. Signs as a Unique Mode of Expression ....................................... 211 
D. Erosion of the Content Neutrality Principle  
Under the Relaxed Approaches ................................................ 215 
 IV. THE STRICT APPROACH TO CONTENT NEUTRALITY:  
DEMANDED BY PRACTICAL NECESSITY ................................ 218 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 223 
INTRODUCTION 
A familiar pattern has repeated itself in many communities throughout 
the United States in the past thirty years. A commercial advertiser or bill-
board company seeks a permit from a local government to erect a sign along 
a principal entry route into the community. Recognizing that such a bill-
board might pose a danger to the aesthetic character of the community by 
blocking scenic views or by creating a garish landscape rife with commercial 
advertising, the local government denies the permit, relying on its sign 
regulations—often contained within the zoning ordinance—to support the 
denial. In response to the denial of the permit, the billboard company sues 
the local government, claiming an infringement upon the company’s First 
Amendment right to free speech. Finding a violation of the First Amend-
ment rights of the billboard plaintiff, a federal judge declares the local sign 
ordinance invalid, leaving a regulatory vacuum that gives sign owners free 
reign to place signs throughout the community. 
The vast proliferation of billboards and other types of signage 
throughout the United States is striking. In 2010, over 400,000 advertising 
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billboards were estimated to exist along the highways and throughout the 
cities of the nation.1 The billboard industry earned $4.8 billion in revenue 
in the first three quarters of 2011,2 and it is not uncommon for a billboard 
lease to cost an advertiser more than $2,500 per month.3 Billboards are 
used most commonly for commercial advertisements, but are also frequent-
ly used for public announcements and advertising by nonprofit 
organizations and government agencies.4 Billboards are typically more 
common in areas where there is vacant land or where signage revenues 
bring benefits to a property owner, such as rural areas or urban spaces that 
have experienced significant poverty. In 1989, there were over 4,000 bill-
boards in Detroit, Michigan, alone, with a disproportionate percentage of 
the billboards located in lower-income neighborhoods of the city.5  
While billboards bring significant revenue to advertisers, sign owners, 
and property owners, they generally detract from the character of nearby 
communities and have been shown to decrease values of surrounding prop-
erties.6 Today, approximately 700 municipalities nationwide have either 
banned or severely curtailed billboard construction, and many communities 
have shown increasing desire to regulate outdoor signage to limit the aes-
thetic impact such signs have on neighborhoods, business districts, and 
rural areas.7 
First Amendment challenges by billboard companies and other sign 
owners to local sign regulations have become a frequent occurrence since 
the Supreme Court first addressed the First Amendment rights of com-
mercial sign owners in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego in 1981.8 The 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Ken Leiser, Digital Billboards: Bright or Blight?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 
26, 2010, at D1. 
 2. Out of Home Advertising Continues to Grow, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ASS’N AM. 
(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.oaaa.org/press/pressreleases/news.aspx?NewsId=1332. 
 3. BRIAN J. CONNOLLY & MARK A. WYCKOFF, MICHIGAN SIGN GUIDEBOOK: THE 
LOCAL PLANNING & REGULATION OF SIGNS 3-2 (2011), available at http://scenicmichigan.org/ 
guidebook_2011.html. 
 4. Id. at 3-2 to 3-3. 
 5. Id. at 15-4. 
 6. Billboards Hamper Economic Growth, SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org/billboards-
a-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/104-billboards-hamper-economic-growth (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2012). 
 7. Billboard Control is Good for Business, SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org/billboards-
a-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/100-billboard-control-is-good-for-business (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2012). 
 8. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (finding the City of San Diego’s sign ordinance unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that it improperly distinguished among signs based on the content of 
the messages displayed); see also John M. Baker & Robin M. Wolpert, The Modern Tower of 
Babel: Defending the New Wave of First Amendment Challenges to Municipal Billboard and Sign 
Regulations, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Oct. 2006, at 3, 3–4 (discussing the number of First 
Amendment challenges to local sign regulations). 
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stakes are high for both commercial sign owners and local governments. 
The high value of outdoor advertising gives the commercial sign industry 
significant incentive—and a great deal of money—to hire lawyers and chal-
lenge sign regulations. Between 2001 and 2006, over 100 cases were filed 
against municipalities by outdoor advertisers around the nation,9 and these 
challenges have continued unabated since that time. On the other hand, 
governments have a myriad of regulatory interests in reducing the number 
and size of outdoor signs.10 Local sign controls have frequently been justi-
fied on the basis of signs’ detrimental impact on traffic safety along 
highways and streets.11 Furthermore, sign and billboard control has become 
an important part of the environmental protection movement—in addition 
to traditional issues, such as wildlife protection and land conservation—as 
it focuses on the visual or scenic quality of the environment.12 Sign regula-
tion is a key piece of the regulatory puzzle for states and local governments 
to protect an important public good—the aesthetic quality of the natural 
and built environments—from noxious intrusions by garish sign displays.13  
Courts have begun to recognize and accept local governments’ interest 
in controlling the proliferation of signage as part of their efforts to improve 
environmental quality.14 In Metromedia, the Supreme Court officially en-
dorsed aesthetic considerations as an acceptable rationale for regulating 
outdoor signage, opening the door for federal courts—and many state 
courts as well—to recognize aesthetic quality as an acceptable governmental 
interest for sign regulation.15 In his dissenting opinion in Metromedia, Chief 
Justice Burger wrote, “a legislative body reasonably can conclude that every 
large billboard adversely affects the environment, for each destroys a 
unique perspective on the landscape and adds to the visual pollution of the 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 4. 
 10. See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 4-4 to 4-6. 
 11. See, e.g., Jerry Wachtel, Digital Billboards, Distracted Drivers, PLANNING, Mar. 2011, 
at 25.  
 12. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN & R. MATTHEW GOEBEL, AESTHETICS, 
COMMUNITY CHARACTER AND THE LAW (Am. Planning Ass’n, Planning Advisory Service 
Report No. 489/490, 1999); see also Billboards Degrade the Natural Environment, SCENIC AM., 
http://www.scenic.org/billboards-a-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/101-billboards-
degrade-the-natural-environment (last visited Sept. 16, 2012); 10 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-25 
(2012) (protecting scenic views as part of state environmental law). 
 13. See CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 4-2. 
 14. Historically, courts required justifications for sign regulation based on community 
health and safety, and did not accept aesthetics or environmental quality as sufficiently 
closely related to community health and safety. See DANIEL MANDELKER ET AL., STREET 
GRAPHICS AND THE LAW 78 (Am. Planning Ass’n, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 
527, 2004).  
 15. 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) (plurality opinion). Aesthetic interests were endorsed 
as sufficient rationale for land use regulations in the Supreme Court’s Berman v. Parker 
decision twenty-seven years earlier. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
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city. Pollution is not limited to the air we breath [sic] and the water we 
drink; it can equally offend the eye and the ear.”16  
Therefore, two competing interests are at stake in sign litigation: the 
ability of sign owners to exercise their First Amendment right to speak, and 
the right of the public to a physical environment of high aesthetic integrity. 
This Note explores the First Amendment requirement of content neutrality 
as it applies to outdoor signs. Content neutrality is the constitutional re-
quirement that government not regulate any aspect of the message of 
speech and instead regulate only the physical—size, height, brightness, 
etc.—aspects of speech.17 Content neutrality is frequently implicated in 
First Amendment litigation over outdoor signage, but the courts’ incon-
sistent treatment of the doctrine has undermined state and local efforts to 
maintain aesthetic environments free from noxious signage. This Note 
argues in favor of a stricter approach to content neutrality, as opposed to a 
functional content neutrality standard that allows regulation of signs based 
on broad subject matter categories or locational context.18 This argument 
places a greater burden on sign regulators to develop the most content-
neutral ordinances possible. Although the proposed approach may appear 
backward in light of the environmental interest in sign regulation and regu-
lators’ desire to have sign regulations upheld, the proposed approach would 
beat billboard companies and sign owners at their own game while limiting 
governments’ exposure to litigation and lessening the risk of sign regula-
tions being struck down, to the detriment of aesthetic quality. The  
recommended approach would reaffirm the First Amendment rights of sign 
owners while ensuring that regulatory bodies have sufficient guidance and 
encounter less risk in ensuring aesthetic environmental protection. 
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the concurrent de-
velopments of aesthetic regulation rooted in the state police power and the 
content neutrality principle that developed within First Amendment law, 
giving specific attention to Metromedia, the complicated Supreme Court 
case where these two doctrines collided. Part II goes on to discuss the con-
fusing aftermath of Metromedia and the growth of two distinct judicial 
responses in the federal district and appellate courts to the content neutrali-
ty principle. There has been a divergence in the judicial treatment of sign 
regulations, with some courts applying strict prohibitions against regula-
tions that distinguish among signs based on content, and other courts using 
a more relaxed standard. Parts III and IV argue that courts should adopt a 
more uniform and strict content neutrality standard when reviewing sign 
regulations. Part III looks at the judicial precedents that dictate such a strict 
                                                                                                                      
 16. 453 U.S. at 560–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 17. See infra Section I.B. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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standard, while analyzing and rejecting arguments used by courts and 
commentators in favor of more relaxed neutrality standards. Part IV ad-
dresses the practical rationales for a stricter content neutrality standard, 
maintaining that a stricter standard would provide more predictability to 
regulators and would limit the pattern of judicial strike-downs of sign ordi-
nances that has occurred in recent years.  
I. SIGN REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF HISTORY 
This Part explores two twentieth-century developments in constitu-
tional law, the rise of aesthetic regulation, and the clarification of the First 
Amendment requirement of content neutrality, which have a significant 
impact on governments’ ability to regulate outdoor signage. This Part brief-
ly reviews the legal history of aesthetic regulation and explores the 
development of the First Amendment doctrine of content neutrality. In 
addition, this Part discusses the collision of these two constitutional con-
cepts in the landmark sign regulation case, Metromedia. 
A. Aesthetic Regulation 
Sign regulation cases in the early part of the twentieth century focused 
primarily on property rights issues associated with the display of signs on 
private property,19 as opposed to the free speech concerns that dominate 
today’s sign cases. The earliest sign regulation cases were rooted in munici-
pal police power authority, with many state courts recognizing 
governments’ authority to regulate the display of signs and other structures 
on privately-owned land, as long as the regulations were passed for a legit-
imate governmental purpose such as health, safety, morals, or public 
welfare.20 Sign regulation authority was impliedly affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1926, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., when it 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); St. Louis Poster Adver. Co. v. 
St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); 
St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911). 
 20. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 73 N.E. 1035, 1039 (Ill. 1905); St. 
Louis Gunning Adver. Co., 137 S.W. at 947–49; Cream City Bill Posting v. City of Milwau-
kee, 147 N.W. 25, 28 (Wis. 1914). In Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., the court 
recognized that public health concerns were a valid basis for regulation, but explained that 
the sign ordinance in question did not further that interest. 74 N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905). These 
cases rejected earlier decisions holding that regulation of sign displays on private property 
necessarily effected an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law. See, 
e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 
(N.J. 1905) (finding that the regulation in question was impermissible because it was not 
within the police power of the state). 
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held that land use regulations could be a valid exercise of state police power 
furthering the public welfare.21  
Early land use and signage cases did not contemplate aesthetics as suf-
ficiently within the realm of public welfare to provide the sole rationale for 
local land use regulations,22 even though aesthetic concerns were permitted 
as a supplementary consideration for land use and sign regulations in some 
states.23 In 1954, however, in Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed aesthetic quality as a valid rationale for land use regulation,24 and 
many states began to follow suit.25 The Supreme Court’s recognition of an 
aesthetic rationale for land use regulations effectively opened the door for 
consideration of environmental concerns in developing zoning and sign 
regulations.26  
B. First Amendment and Content Neutrality 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence largely neglect-
ed the free speech implications of regulating permanent outdoor signage 
before the late 1970s.27 The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence had 
long required viewpoint neutrality, meaning that a regulation could not 
                                                                                                                      
 21. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).  
 22. See, e.g., Paterson Bill Posting, 62 A. at 268 (“Aesthetic considerations are a matter 
of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the 
exercise of the police power . . . .”). 
 23. See, e.g., Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 271 N.W. 823, 825 
(Mich. 1937). 
 24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 25. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561–62 (Mass. 
1955); Gannett Outdoor Co. of Mich. v. City of Troy, 409 N.W.2d 719, 722–23 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1986); State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. 1980); Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401, 
408 (N.J. 1955); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222–
23 (Wis. 1955). 
 26. See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean.”). Courts and the public now generally recognize aesthetic regulation—sign regulation 
included—as a crucial part of creating a healthy visual, natural, and ecological environment. 
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555–57 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (discussing “the authority of local government to protect its citizens’ legitimate 
interests in traffic safety and the environment by eliminating distracting and ugly structures 
from its buildings and roadways”). Furthermore, Congress’s broad understanding of what 
constitutes the environment for regulatory purposes supports an understanding of aesthetic 
regulation as an environmental aim; the National Environmental Policy Act requires federal 
agencies to use “all practicable means” to “preserve important historic, cultural, and natural 
aspects of our national heritage.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012). 
 27. See Randal R. Morrison, Sign Regulation, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND 
EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 109 (Daniel R. Mandelker & 
Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001).  
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control the display of messages containing a particular political viewpoint.28 
However, in 1972, the Court expressly prohibited government regulation of 
the content or subject matter of protected speech,29 such that the govern-
ment may not impose differential burdens on speech based on its general 
subject matter.30 The content neutrality principle grew out of a concern that 
government action regulating speech based on its subject overcomes an 
individual’s right to decide the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression or 
consideration,31 and that government selection of subject matter offers the 
significant potential for untrammeled discretion by government officials, 
leading to the suppression of certain ideas.32 A content-neutral regulation is 
deemed to be a “time, place, and manner” regulation, which regulates to 
some extent the temporal, locational, and other non-speech aspects of pro-
tected speech.33 In the context of a sign, a time, place, and manner 
regulation would focus on the sign’s placement, size, height, area, and 
brightness, for example, instead of regulating the types of words or images 
on the sign. 
The development of the commercial speech doctrine was also critical in 
bringing outdoor signage under First Amendment protection. Before 1976, 
the Court did not afford First Amendment protection to commercial 
                                                                                                                      
 28. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 29. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.” (emphasis omitted)). The distinction between viewpoint 
neutrality and content neutrality was perhaps best articulated in Boos v. Barry, where the 
Supreme Court struck down a Washington, D.C., ordinance that prohibited the display of 
signs or other communicative devices critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of a 
property used or occupied by any foreign government. 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (plurality 
opinion). The Court stated that “a regulation that ‘does not favor either side of a political 
controversy’ is nonetheless impermissible because the ‘First Amendment’s hostility to 
content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.’ 
Here the government has determined that an entire category of speech—signs or displays 
critical of foreign governments—is not to be permitted.” Id. at 319 (emphasis and internal 
citation omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 
(1980)).  
 30. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47–48 
(1987). 
 31. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. (“Laws [that are content-based] pose the inherent risk that the Government 
seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or infor-
mation or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”); see also 
Stone, supra note 30, at 55–57.  
 33. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); see also Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Sign Regulation and Free Speech: Spooking the Doppelganger, in TRENDS IN LAND 
USE LAW FROM A TO Z: ADULT USES TO ZONING 70–71 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001) (“A 
time, place, and manner regulation is a law that regulates activities to protect governmental 
interests unrelated to speech. An example is an ordinance that contains limitations on the 
size, number, and height of signs.”). 
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speech.34 That notion was discarded, however, in the 1976 Supreme Court 
case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,35 on the grounds that a democratic society has an interest in the “free 
flow of commercial information.”36 The Court later clarified however, that 
commercial speech enjoyed a lesser protection than other speech,37 and 
adopted a four-part intermediate scrutiny test to deal with government 
restrictions on commercial speech.38 Therefore, regulation of signs contain-
ing a commercial message will be reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny 
test. 
The first application of the commercial speech doctrine to outdoor 
signage came in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, decided 
in 1977.39 The Court invalidated an ordinance banning the display of out-
door real estate signs that was enacted out of local concern that a 
proliferation of such signs would destabilize the local housing market and 
encourage “white flight.”40 In invalidating the ordinance, the Court found 
that the ordinance failed to offer ample alternative channels for communi-
cating information on homes for sale,41 and that the ordinance was enacted 
for the purpose of suppressing information.42 The Court held that the 
township improperly restricted the free flow of truthful commercial infor-
mation and had failed to show that the restriction was necessary to achieve 
its goal of encouraging stable, racially-integrated housing.43 Although the 
Court intimated some concern about the content neutrality of the ordi-
nance in question, Linmark was decided based on the suppressive character 
of the ordinance in question;44 the Court saved for another day the question 
of whether a prohibition against real estate signs violated the requirement 
of content neutrality.  
                                                                                                                      
 34. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641–45 (1951); Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 35. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 36. Id. at 765. 
 37. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
 38. Id. at 563–64. The four-part Central Hudson test requires that the speech being 
restricted be lawful and non-misleading, the regulations must be supported by a substantial 
governmental interest, that the regulation directly further that interest, and that the regula-
tion be no broader than necessary. 
 39. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
 40. Id. at 87–91. 
 41. Id. at 93. 
 42. Id. at 93–94. In the Supreme Court’s eyes, the township’s declared purpose for 
enacting the ban was that it feared that the signs’ “ ‘primary’ effect [is] that they will cause 
those receiving the information to act upon it.” Id. at 94. 
 43. Id. at 95–96. 
 44. Id. at 95–97. 
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C. Collision of Aesthetics and the First Amendment: Metromedia  
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the First Amendment rights of 
commercial advertisers and its application of First Amendment doctrine to 
outdoor signs in Linmark was a turning point.45 In one fell swoop, the 
Court handed billboard companies and commercial sign owners a new, First 
Amendment-based litigation strategy to challenge municipal sign regula-
tions.46 Decided just four years after Linmark, Metromedia was the first case 
in which the Supreme Court considered First Amendment claims by bill-
board owners.47 In Metromedia, a billboard company successfully challenged 
the City of San Diego’s sign ordinance, which prohibited the display of off-
premises signs, with some exceptions.48 Despite the case’s importance as a 
guidepost for sign regulation, the outcome of Metromedia was a confusing 
and fractured49 five-part opinion, described by Justice Rehnquist as “a vir-
tual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly 
drawn.”50  
To the extent that conclusions can be found in Metromedia, a majority 
of the justices agreed on three critical points.51 First, a majority found that 
the city’s aesthetic concerns, which led to the enactment of the ordinance,52 
served a substantial governmental purpose supporting regulations concern-
                                                                                                                      
 45. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 109. 
 46. See Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 3. 
 47. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Metromedia is uni-
versally recognized as the foundational case on sign law. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, 
LAND USE LAW § 11.13 (5th ed., 2003); Morrison, supra note 27, at 110. 
 48. 453 U.S. at 493–96 (plurality opinion). “Off-premises” is a classification that 
applies to signs whose messages relate to an activity that is not conducted on the property 
where the sign is displayed. Conversely, an “on-premises” sign has a message that relates in 
some manner to the activities being conducted on the property where the sign is displayed. 
Id. at 494. 
 49. Morrison, supra note 27, at 106 (describing Metromedia as “an archetype of the 
cloudiness that permeates the law of signs”); see also M. Ryan Calo, Scylla or Charybdis: 
Navigating the Jurisprudence of Visual Clutter, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1877, 1879 n.18 (2005) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s divisions in Metromedia). 
 50. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 51. CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-3. 
 52. The San Diego ordinance acknowledged that the city’s aesthetic concerns were 
part of a set of broader environmental goals. The ordinance stated, “It is the intent of these 
regulations to protect an important aspect of the economic base of the City by preventing 
the destruction of the natural beauty and environment of the City, which is instrumental in 
attracting nonresidents who come to visit, trade, vacation or attend conventions; to safe-
guard and enhance property values; to protect public and private investment in buildings 
and open spaces; and to protect the public health, safety and general welfare.” Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1977) (quoting SAN DIEGO, 
CAL., ORDINANCE 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972)). 
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ing speech,53 thereby endorsing aesthetics as a proper governmental ra-
tionale for commercial speech regulations.54 Because the environmental and 
aesthetic regulatory interests parallel one another,55 this Metromedia holding 
was critically important for the regulation of signage on environmental 
grounds. Second, a majority held that sign regulations must be content-
neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions,56 applying the content neu-
trality requirement to government regulations of outdoor signage.57 Third, 
a majority agreed that a sign regulation may not favor commercial speech 
over noncommercial speech either directly or indirectly,58 as this type of 
regulation would constitute an impermissible content-based distinction.59 
Thus, San Diego’s ban on off-premises signage violated the First Amend-
ment because the ban prohibited commercial property owners from 
displaying noncommercial signage unrelated to the activity on the property, 
thereby effecting a content-based regulation favoring commercial speech 
over noncommercial speech.60  
One of the primary areas of post-Metromedia confusion surrounds the 
type and degree of content neutrality required by the First Amendment in 
the context of sign regulation.61 Although it restated the basic principle of 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507–08 (“[T]he twin goals that the ordinance seeks to 
further—traffic safety and the appearance of the city—are substantial governmental goals.”). 
 54. Aesthetic concerns are also a valid regulatory purpose for regulation of noncom-
mercial speech, which requires a regulation to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, in which aesthetic considerations are included. See Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Note that, in reviewing content-based 
regulations, the Court applies strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Members of City Council of 
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 821 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 55. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 560–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 516.  
 57. The Metromedia plurality opinion suggested that ordinances could distinguish 
among broad categories of commercial speech, id. at 512, but the concurrence strongly 
rejected that notion. See id. at 536. The plurality’s observation seems to be at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s earlier opinion demanding content neutrality in government regulations of 
commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. See Virginia 
Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
 58. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. The reason that a ban on off-premises signage inherently favors commercial 
speech was summed up well in Vono v. Lewis, in which the court, discussing a similar ban on 
off-premises signage, stated, “The owner of a music store, to take one example, could not 
replace her ‘Drums For Sale’ sign with a ‘Cut Property Taxes Now!’ message unless she 
conducted some tax-related activity in the music store. So, while the drum seller . . . could 
not advertise cars she also would be prohibited from expressing her strongly held views to 
limit taxes, to stop the war, support a candidate, or root for the Red Sox.” 594 F. Supp. 2d 
189, 203–04 (D.R.I. 2009). 
 61. R. Douglass Bond, Note, Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying Prohibitions and 
Exceptions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2482, 2507 (1990).  
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content neutrality, the Metromedia plurality opinion endorsed two poten-
tially content-based distinctions: the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech, and the distinction between on-premises and off-
premises signage.62 By resting its First Amendment analysis on San Diego’s 
failure to accommodate noncommercial speech in places where commercial 
speech was allowed, the plurality approved a bifurcated approach to sign 
regulation based on whether the message of the sign is commercial or non-
commercial in nature.63 Furthermore, by upholding an ordinance that 
distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, the Court ap-
peared to suggest that some degree of message-based regulation was 
permissible under the First Amendment.64 Instead of requiring that sign 
regulations be truly content neutral so as to reject any regulation of a sign’s 
message, portions of the Metromedia opinion affirmed distinctions that 
carry message-related implications for regulation.65 Metromedia’s effect, 
then, was to call into question the Court’s prior content neutrality require-
ments—entering into murky territory where government officials could 
potentially censor speech in the sign permit review process—and to create 
confusion among courts, government regulators, and attorneys.  
Metromedia stands as the foundational case in First Amendment sign 
law, because it served as the intersection of the Supreme Court’s recogni-
tion of local governments’ land use authority premised on aesthetic 
grounds, and the Court’s demands that regulations of speech contain no 
reference to content. However, the confusing nature of the case’s outcome 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Calo, supra note 49, at 1881–82.  
 63. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting 
the obvious problem with this approach, saying “an ordinance . . . banning commercial 
billboards but allowing noncommercial billboards . . . raises First Amendment problems at 
least as serious as those raised by a total ban, for it gives city officials the right—before 
approving a billboard—to determine whether the proposed message is ‘commercial’ or 
‘noncommercial.’ ”). Despite the Supreme Court’s dedication to delineating the commercial-
noncommercial distinction, the Court has not articulated a precise delineation between 
commercial and noncommercial speech. 
 64. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Courts since Metromedia have noted the inherent 
content neutrality problem with the on-premises/off-premises distinction. See, e.g., Vono, 594 
F. Supp. 2d at 200–01 (finding the distinction between on- and off-premises signage to be a 
message-based distinction because the government must determine whether or not the 
message relates to the premises); Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 132 
P.3d 5, 16 (Or. 2006) (finding that the on-premises/off-premises distinction violates the 
Oregon constitution’s free speech guarantee). At least one court has found that the on-
premises/off-premises distinction does not violate the prohibition on content-based regula-
tion because regulations containing such a distinction are regulating speech based on its 
location, not its content; this is not widely followed. See generally, Mandelker, supra note 33, 
at 76–77. 
 65. See, e.g., Vono, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 200–01 (discussing the message-based distinc-
tions in Metromedia). 
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has plagued courts and commentators. The next Part explores a key division 
on the content neutrality requirement that has taken place since Metromedia. 
II. CRACKS IN THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE  
Because none of the opinions in Metromedia gained majority support in 
the decision, the precedential value of the case as it pertains to sign regula-
tion and the First Amendment is somewhat murky. Under the rule 
articulated in Marks v. United States, lower courts are not bound by any 
particular line of reasoning in plurality opinions such as Metromedia.66 
Lower courts are, however, required to comply with the “position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”67 Largely due to the confusion that resulted from the five Metro-
media opinions, federal appeals courts have taken two decidedly different 
directions in the degree of content neutrality required of sign regulations.68 
One on hand, some courts have taken a “literal-minded”69 approach that 
approximates complete neutrality, disallowing any regulation based on a 
sign’s overarching subject matter,70 and some have even disallowed distinc-
tions such as that between on-premises and off-premises signage.71 On the 
other hand, some courts have taken a more relaxed—or functional—
approach, allowing regulations to distinguish between broad categories of 
signage,72 and in some cases, allowing regulations to differentiate between 
signs based on their relevance to the site at which they are located.73 This 
division has widened dramatically over the past twenty years, with at least 
two circuits subscribing to the stricter approach,74 and three circuits sub-
                                                                                                                      
 66. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 67. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976); see also Calo, supra note 49, at 
1880–81. 
 68. Susan L. Trevarthen, Best Practices in First Amendment Land Use Regulations, PLAN. 
& ENVTL. L., June 2009, at 3, 8. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 736 (8th 
Cir. 2011) reh’g en banc denied; Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 
(11th Cir. 2005). The regulations struck down in Solantic included broad category-based 
distinctions, such as “identification” signs or “religious displays.” Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1257.  
 71. See, e.g., Outdoor Media Dimensions v. Dep’t of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 16 (Or. 
2006). 
 72. See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622 (6th Cir. 
2009) (upholding regulation containing differing regulations for “business” signs, “advertis-
ing” signs, and “political” signs). 
 73. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1064–65 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Wheeler v. Comm’r. of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 74. The Eighth, see Neighborhood Enters., 644 F.3d at 736, and Eleventh, see Solantic, 
410 F.3d at 1266, Circuit Courts have led the charge toward a stricter approach. The First 
Circuit generally follows this approach as well. See Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 
N.H., 513 F.3d 27, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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scribing to the more flexible approaches.75 This Part explores the context-
sensitive and category-based approaches (collectively, the “functional ap-
proach”), and contrasts these approaches to the strict content neutrality 
approach. 
A. The Functional Approach 
The functional approach for determining the content neutrality of sign 
regulations has two strands: one allows broad “category-based” determina-
tions, and the other allows “context-sensitive”76 distinctions. The category-
based line of cases generally accepts that governments can regulate signs 
according to broad, potentially subject-based categories of signs.77 Under a 
category-based approach, a sign ordinance could potentially differentiate 
between “political,” “real estate,” “construction,” “identification,” or “direc-
tional” signs, and such a differentiation would not run afoul of the First 
Amendment.78 Chief Justice Burger’s Metromedia dissent supported this 
model, as he would have upheld the San Diego ordinance on the grounds 
that the broad categories of signs excepted from the ordinance were seem-
ingly noncontroversial and had some rational relationship to the public’s 
need for their regulation.79 Further support is found in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, where the Court appeared 
to suggest that the content neutrality requirement was met simply when the 
government’s regulatory interest was justified without reference to content.80 
                                                                                                                      
 75. The Sixth, see H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622, and Seventh, see Lavey v. City 
of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir. 1999), Circuit Courts have allowed category-
based regulations. The Ninth Circuit has generally adhered to a stricter approach to deter-
mining content neutrality, although it has allowed some category-based restrictions in 
certain cases. See G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2006). The Third Circuit has also permitted signs in certain places based on their relevance 
to the site at which they are displayed. See Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 
389–90 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 76. The term context-sensitive was coined in Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064, but this ap-
proach has also been titled the “site relevance theory.” Morrison, supra note 27, at 115. 
 77. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2009); 
H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622; S. Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of 
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 896–97 (7th Cir. 1991); Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 591. 
 78. See Reed, 587 F.3d at 977; H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622; Lavey, 171 F.3d at 
1112 n.5; Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 591. 
 79. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 564–65 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Where the [San Diego] ordinance does differentiate among topics, it simply 
allows such noncontroversial things as conventional signs identifying a business enterprise, 
time-and-temperature signs, historical markers, and for sale signs . . . [It may be] frivolous 
to suggest that, by allowing such signs but forbidding noncommercial billboards, the city has 
infringed freedom of speech.”). 
 80. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). This statement has been the subject of significant hand-
wringing by the Supreme Court and lower courts. Compare the Court’s statement in City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (noting that Cincinnati’s “mens 
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The Court was silent as to whether the regulation was actually content 
neutral. 
Alternatively, courts following the context-sensitive approach to deter-
mining the validity of sign regulations acknowledge that some messages are 
more important than others at certain locations81 in order to justify con-
tent-based exceptions to the general rule.82 This approach has roots in both 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence83 and Chief Justice Burger’s dissent84 in 
Metromedia, both of which noted that the communicative value of having 
some signs at certain locations may outweigh the government’s interest in 
aesthetics or traffic safety. A context-sensitive ordinance, in other words, 
would “constitutionally contain content-based exceptions as long as the 
content exempted from restriction is significantly related to the particular 
area in which the sign is viewed—for example, a sign identifying the prop-
erty on which it sits as a restaurant, or a sign alongside a highway which 
tells drivers how to reach a nearby city.”85 The context-sensitive approach 
certainly tolerates the on-premises/off-premises distinction86 and is openly 
forgiving toward broad subject matter-based exceptions to general bans on 
certain types of signage.87 
Rappa v. New Castle County is a foundational application of both the 
category-based and context-sensitive approaches.88 The case dealt with a 
                                                                                                                      
rea” in choosing between messages based on content was irrelevant), with its reaffirmation 
of the Ward standard in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 81. See, e.g., Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064–65; see also Jason R. Burt, Note, Speech Interests 
Inherent in the Location of Billboards and Signs: A Method for Unweaving the Tangled Web of 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 2006 BYU L. REV. 473, 518–19 (2006) (advocating 
the adoption of a context-sensitive approach in determining whether local ordinances meet 
the content neutrality requirement of the First Amendment). 
 82. Morrison, supra note 27, at 115. 
 83. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I 
would allow an exception only if it directly furthers an interest that is at least as important 
as the interest underlying the total ban . . . .”). 
 84. See id. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he city reasonably could conclude that 
the balance between safety and aesthetic concerns on the one hand and the need to com-
municate on the other has tipped the opposite way.”). 
 85. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047. 
 86. See Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (1987) (“[T]he on-
premises/off-premises distinction does not constitute an impermissible regulation of content 
just because the determination of whether a sign is permitted at a given location is a func-
tion of the sign’s message.”). 
 87. See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1063–64. Exceptions to general bans on signs pose particular 
problems when they are content-based; for example, a city that bans all temporary signage 
but then allows an exception for “political” signs has made an exception based on the con-
tent—the political nature—of the sign’s message.  
 88. Id. at 1043. Rappa has been followed and expanded upon by the Third Circuit in at 
least two more-recent cases. See Melrose v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 389–90 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 747–48 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Connolly_Final_WEB 1/22/2013  1:44 PM 
200 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:1 
Delaware law generally prohibiting signage within twenty-five feet of 
highway rights-of-way.89 The law contained a number of exemptions from 
the prohibition, including exemptions for “signs advertising the sale or lease 
of the real property on which they are located” and signs advertising the 
activities conducted on the property on which the sign is located.90 In re-
viewing the exemptions from the Delaware law’s prohibition, the court 
relied upon Justice Brennan’s Metromedia concurrence, articulating a test 
whereby an exemption from a total ban would need to directly further a 
governmental “interest that is at least as important as the interest underly-
ing the total ban,” in a way that was narrowly drawn and not more broad 
than is necessary.91 The court then went on to determine that the govern-
ment’s regulatory interest in allowing the communication of certain 
information at certain places was at least as important as the government’s 
regulatory interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, thus justifying the ex-
ceptions to the ban.92 The court noted, for example, that a speed limit sign 
along a highway or an advertisement of a commercial establishment on the 
property where the establishment is located are signs for which the gov-
ernmental interest in allowing access to important information is 
sufficiently important to overcome a general ban on roadside signage.93  
B. The Strict Content-Neutral Approach 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are courts that require sign regu-
lations to be entirely content neutral, and which have invalidated any sign 
regulation that deals with the subject matter or message of the sign.94 Un-
                                                                                                                      
 89. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1051. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1064 (quoting Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490, 532 n.10 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). While exemptions from total bans attract significant attention 
from courts because they are commonly content-based, total bans without exemptions may 
also carry First Amendment problems if they may fail the narrow tailoring requirement of 
the intermediate scrutiny test or may not leave open ample alternative channels of commu-
nication. See generally City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994); Cent. Hudson Gas 
and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1980); Lusk v. Vill. of Cold 
Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 2007); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 
88 F.3d 382, 388–90 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 92. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064 (“Some signs are more important than others not because 
of a determination that they are generally more important than other signs, but because they 
are more related to the particular location than are other signs.”). 
 93. Id. The Rappa court struck down a portion of the Delaware law that exempted 
signs advertising local cities and industries from the general ban, finding that the interest in 
communicating such off-premises commercial advertisements was not more important than 
the aesthetic and traffic safety interests that justified the underlying ban. Id. at 1068. 
 94. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (2005); 
Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[O]nly the most 
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der this approach, sign regulations that purport to regulate in any way 
based on the subject matter of the sign, even if such regulations are based 
on seemingly benign broad categories of subjects,95 are found to violate the 
First Amendment. Courts following this stricter approach place a heavy 
reliance on plain understandings of the Supreme Court’s blanket state-
ments on the content neutrality requirement,96 first in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley,97 and later in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC.98 In 
addition, some commentators and litigators, particularly billboard company 
plaintiffs, have advocated an extreme approach—often termed the “need to 
read” approach—that would invalidate a sign ordinance solely on the 
grounds that a government enforcement official would need to read the 
sign’s message to enforce the ordinance.99 Such an absolutist model has 
been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court,100 and creates a near-
absurdity for practical regulatory purposes.101 
The strict content-neutral approach was articulated in the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,102 in which 
the court invalidated a city ordinance based on its definition of “sign.” The 
city code’s “sign” definition contained two exclusions from its scope, includ-
ing an exclusion for the symbols or crests of civic organizations and an 
exclusion for art works.103 The owner of a wall mural, which contained a 
political message in addition to artwork, challenged the city’s enforcement 
of its sign code against the mural, arguing that the ordinance was content-
based because it required city officials to review the sign’s content to de-
termine whether the ordinance applied.104 The Court of Appeals agreed 
with the sign owner, noting that the sign’s content was the determining 
                                                                                                                      
extraordinary circumstances will justify regulation of protected expression based upon its 
content.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54 F.3d 1400, 1404 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(striking down an ordinance that created special restrictions for political signs). 
 96. E.g., Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1258–59. 
 97. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 98. 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also Morrison, supra note 27, 
at 108 (discussing the strict content-neutral approach articulated in Turner Broad. Sys.). 
 99. Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 8. 
 100. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–21 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 101. The impossibility of such an approach is exemplified by the fact that an enforce-
ment official must at least look at an object to determine if the object falls under the 
regulatory ambit of the sign regulation; definitions contained within the law would undoubt-
edly need to refer to some communicative elements within the borders of the sign. See id. 
 102. 644 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 103. Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 
(E.D. Mo. 2010). 
 104. See Neighborhood Enters., 644 F.3d at 735–36. 
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factor as to whether the sign was subject to the ordinance restriction, since 
an enforcement officer was required to review the mural to determine 
whether it was subject to the ordinance.105 Other courts following the strict 
approach have invalidated sign ordinances that distinguish among “govern-
mental” flags,106 “decorative flags,” “memorial signs,” “signs . . . directing 
and guiding traffic,” and various other signs categorized based on the mes-
sage of the sign.107 In some cases, courts applying the more literal 
interpretation of content neutrality have noted that the on-premises/off-
premises distinction is content-based because it is, in fact, a regulation of 
the message of the sign.108  
The more relaxed approach to content neutrality necessarily (and 
courts applying this approach admit as much)109 affords the government the 
opportunity to evaluate the content of a sign when enforcing a sign regula-
tion, which is precisely the type of action that the First Amendment was 
designed to prevent.110 Thus, the context-sensitive and category-based 
approaches, which require less than complete content neutrality, offer 
courts and governments a clear opportunity to derogate the content neu-
trality rule articulated by the Supreme Court. As long as courts and  
governments continue to disagree over the degree of content neutrality 
required by the First Amendment, billboard companies and other sign 
owners will continue to have viable opportunities to challenge regulations 
designed to improve the aesthetic integrity of communities. As this Note 
discusses in the following sections, requiring governments to adhere to the 
strictest form of content neutrality in developing sign regulations and 
reinforcing the rigorous demands of the First Amendment is necessitated 
by the Supreme Court’s unqualified statements on content neutrality, the 
particular character of sign regulations as distinguished from other forms of 
speech regulation, and by the practical effects of sign litigation. 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. at 736.  
 106. See Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 107. See Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
 108. See, e.g., Ackerley Commc’ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 88 F.3d 33, 36 
n.7 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In ‘commonsense’ terms, the [on-premises/off-premises] distinction 
surely is content-based because determining whether a sign may stay up or must come down 
requires consideration of the message it carries.”). The stricter content neutrality approach is 
also less forgiving to exceptions from general bans on signage, tolerating only those excep-
tions that are not based on the content of the message. See G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake 
Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076–79 (9th Cir. 2006) (permitting content-neutral exceptions 
from general sign ban). 
 109. See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1047 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
content-based regulation may be constitutionally permissible in some situations). 
 110. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640–41 (1994) (plurality 
opinion). 
Connolly_Final_WEB 1/22/2013  1:44 PM 
Fall 2012] Environmental Aesthetics and Free Speech 203 
III. DOCTRINAL DEMANDS FOR THE 
STRICT CONTENT-NEUTRAL APPROACH 
Although the strict content-neutral approach places a great burden on 
the governmental entities responsible for sign regulation, this approach is 
the proper legal standard for judicial review of sign regulations. This Part 
discusses relevant Supreme Court precedent demanding strict content 
neutrality and the broadening of the content neutrality principle since its 
inception in First Amendment jurisprudence. The uniqueness of sign regu-
lation, and why its uniqueness reinforces the applicability of the approach, 
is also addressed. Finally, this Part describes how the relaxed approaches 
leave significant opportunity for erosion of the content neutrality principle 
and thus a derogation of individual sign owners’ First Amendment rights. 
A. Precedent and the Broadening Scope of Content Neutrality 
Lower federal courts and state courts dealing with First Amendment 
sign regulation challenges almost uniformly turn to the confusing Supreme 
Court opinions in Metromedia for direction and precedent on sign regula-
tion.111 However, the Court has issued more coherent articulations of the 
content neutrality principle with more precedential value in defining a 
content neutrality standard for sign regulations.112 Majority statements in 
other Supreme Court cases113 preclude the application of the context-
sensitive or category-specific approaches to content neutrality.114 Although 
the Supreme Court has struck down decidedly content-based sign regula-
tions since Metromedia,115 it has not upset any of its pre- or post-Metromedia 
blanket statements holding that the First Amendment requires complete 
content neutrality in the form of avoiding any message- or subject-based 
regulation.116 
                                                                                                                      
 111. See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 69.  
 112. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 113. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978); Mosley, 
408 U.S. at 96. 
 114. The Court’s statements on the demands of content neutrality have not generally 
contained exceptions to the general rule that speech regulations should not regulate any part 
of the message of the speech. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 641–42 (discussing the 
general rule, but noting the fact that narrow exceptions to the rule are recognized); Mosley, 
408 U.S. at 95; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (expressing the general rule, but 
noting limited exceptions). 
 115. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(discussing the demands of content neutrality as reflecting “important insights into the 
meaning of the free speech principle—for instance, that content-based speech restrictions 
are especially likely to be improper attempts to value some forms of speech over others, or 
are particularly susceptible to being used by the government to distort public debate”). 
 116. See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Turner Broad. 
Sys., 512 U.S. at 641–42. 
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Even before Mosley, the Court declared that “governmental bodies may 
not prescribe the form or content of individual expression.”117 The Court’s 
first full-fledged discussion of the content neutrality concept in Mosley left 
no room for error in condemning the speech regulation in question:  
The central problem with [the] ordinance is that it describes per-
missible picketing in terms of its subject matter . . . . The operative 
distinction is the message on a . . . sign. But, above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.118 
The Court then added,  
[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free 
from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censor-
ship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity  
because of its content would completely undercut the “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”119 
Thus, in the Court’s first full statement on content neutrality, it did not 
envision the relaxations and carve-outs that the functional approaches have 
established.120 
Since its initial recognition of the principle, the Court’s dedication to 
content neutrality has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.121 In Consolidat-
ed Edison v. Public Service Commission, the Court wrote, “a constitutionally 
permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either 
the content or subject matter of speech.”122 The Court’s carefully-chosen use 
of the term “subject matter,” distinguishable from its use of the term “view-
point,” is perhaps the most clear suggestion that the Court envisioned a 
broadly sweeping standard when reviewing speech regulations for content 
neutrality;123 the holding reinforces the notion that the government has no 
business regulating the message, or differentiating between messages and 
categories, of constitutionally protected speech.124 The Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                      
 117. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.  
 118. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at 96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).  
 120. See id. at 95. 
 121. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000) (plurality opinion); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 530, 536 (1980).  
 122. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.  
 123. See supra note 29. 
 124. See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.  
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broad statements on the absolute requirements of content neutrality thus 
do not appear to line up with more lax applications of the content neutrali-
ty doctrine in some courts’ treatment of sign regulations following 
Metromedia. 
The Court’s recent handling of some previously acceptable content-
based distinctions points to a broadening scope of the content neutrality 
principle. In particular, the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence 
has called into question the commercial-noncommercial distinction upheld 
in Metromedia.125 The Metromedia majority found that the commercial-
noncommercial distinction was acceptable in the context of sign regula-
tion126 over the cautious concurrence of Justice Brennan.127 In the context of 
sign regulation, post-Metromedia courts dealing with the commercial-
noncommercial distinction began to require that local sign regulations 
contain “substitution clauses,”128 ordinance clauses which allow the substitu-
tion of noncommercial copy on any sign allowed in the jurisdiction.129 
Courts continue to forbid any favoring of commercial over noncommercial 
speech, and they almost always approve of ordinance provisions which offer 
greater protection for noncommercial speech; thus, the substitution clause 
is a modern requirement for sign regulations.130 
The Supreme Court has, however, shown a recent willingness to grant 
greater protection to commercial speech,131 and in at least one case has 
required that commercial speech be regulated on par with noncommercial 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Morrison, supra note 27, at 110. 
 126. See id. at 111–12. The Metromedia Court relied on its prior holdings relating to the 
then-newly-articulated commercial speech doctrine to support the suggestion that a ban on 
commercial signage that exempted noncommercial signage would be acceptable under the 
First Amendment. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (noting 
that the regulation in question passes the test set out in Central Hudson). 
 127. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521–22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
commercial-noncommercial distinction was a violation of the Court’s aforesaid commitment 
to content neutrality). 
 128. See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 247–48 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(striking down ordinance which failed to contain a clause permitting the display of non-
commercial copy on any sign permitted in the city); Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 
F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1985) (striking down ordinance which clearly favored commercial speech 
over noncommercial speech); cf. Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 611 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that ordinances contained substitution clause as required to be constitu-
tionally permissible); Georgia Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 
(4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the inclusion of a substitution clause ensured that the ordinance 
did not favor commercial speech); Major Media of the Se., Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 
1269, 1271–72 (4th Cir. 1986) (endorsing city ordinance provision which permitted the 
display of a noncommercial message on any sign permitted in the city). 
 129. Morrison, supra note 27, at 114. 
 130. Trevarthen, supra note 68, at 9. 
 131. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 110. 
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speech.132 In Discovery Network, the Court dealt with a local ordinance in 
Cincinnati that, in the interest of protecting and enhancing community 
aesthetics, banned the on-street dissemination of commercial handbills 
while concurrently allowing the dissemination of noncommercial hand-
bills.133 After receiving notice from the municipal government that they 
were in violation of the ordinance, commercial newsrack companies brought 
suit on First Amendment grounds, and the Supreme Court ultimately 
struck down the ordinance.134 Applying the Central Hudson commercial 
speech test, the Court found that the ban on commercial newsracks did not 
directly advance the city’s interest in aesthetics, in that noncommercial 
newsracks were just as damaging to community aesthetics as commercial 
newsracks.135 Furthermore, the Court found that the ordinance was clearly 
content-based, because the determination as to whether a newsrack was 
permitted was based on the content of the newspapers being distributed 
from it.136 Discovery Network was the first time that the Court placed an 
apparent limit on the distinction that could be drawn between commercial 
and noncommercial speech,137 although it is presently unclear how far the 
limit extends.138  
Despite the Court’s suggestion that its holding in Discovery Network is 
narrow,139 the holding is representative of an expansion of the content neu-
trality doctrine from the Metromedia days.140 Whereas the Metromedia 
plurality determined that San Diego’s ban on offsite commercial bill-
boards—a partial ban on advertising signage in the city—was not 
impermissibly underinclusive because the ban furthered the city’s aesthetic 
                                                                                                                      
 132. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 133. Id. at 413, n.3. 
 134. Id. at 431. 
 135. Id. at 418 (“We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider [safety 
and community aesthetics] an insufficient justification for the discrimination against re-
spondents’ use of [commercial] newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted 
[noncommercial] newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of 
newsracks on the city’s sidewalks.”). 
 136. Id. at 429 (“Under the city’s newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls 
within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. 
Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content 
based.’ ”). 
 137. See id. at 419 (“[T]he city’s argument attaches more importance to the distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously under-
estimates the value of commercial speech.”). 
 138. Mandelker, supra note 33, at 78 (noting that the Court intended for its Discovery 
Network holding to be narrow, as a municipality may be able to justify differential regulation 
of commercial and noncommercial newsracks). 
 139. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428. 
 140. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 116. 
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and traffic safety goals,141 Discovery Network represents a clear departure 
from Metromedia’s endorsement of a partial ban.142 By finding Cincinnati’s 
favoring of noncommercial newsracks over commercial newsracks to be 
content-based, the Discovery Network Court appeared to backtrack from the 
Metromedia plurality’s endorsement of the distinction as a legitimate basis 
for regulation.143 Furthermore, the commercial speech doctrine may be 
undergoing further sterilization, given the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, in which the Court reviewed a commercial speech 
regulation under the standards typically applied to noncommercial 
speech.144 Thus, by eliminating the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech and finding it to be content-based, Discovery Net-
work dramatically expanded the scope of the content neutrality requirement 
for speech regulation.145 
The Court has continued to broaden the content neutrality doctrine 
since Discovery Network,146 further intimating a desire for a stricter content 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511 (1981) (plurality  
opinion). 
 142. See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 78. 
 143. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 514–15.  
 144. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (addressing a Vermont statute restricting “detailing,” the 
process by which pharmaceutical companies collect information on individual doctors’ 
prescription practices). 
 145. Many courts and authors have refused to recognize Discovery Network as eliminat-
ing the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. See generally Morrison, 
supra note 27, at 116–17. Furthermore, a number of cases have declined to extend the Discov-
ery Network tailoring analysis to outdoor sign regulation, finding that partial sign bans (i.e. 
on commercial billboards) have a noticeable impact furthering municipalities’ aesthetic 
goals. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94, 108–09 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he City has a ‘sufficient basis’ to believe that the impact of the zoning 
regulations [banning commercial billboards along city highways] will substantially advance 
its proffered [aesthetic] interests.”); RTM Media, LLC v. City of Houston, 584 F.3d 220, 
227 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Houston has demonstrated that its approach to ameliorating the 
billboard problem is ‘carefully calculated’ and that, because of their number, commercial 
billboards pose a greater nuisance than do noncommercial ones.”); see also Metro Lights, 
LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nlike, for instance, the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial newsracks in Discovery Network, here 
there is ‘some basis for distinguishing’ offsite commercial signage concentrated and con-
trolled at transit stops and uncontrolled, private, offsite commercial signage ‘that is relevant 
to an interest asserted by the city’ . . . .”). Some commentators and courts have suggested 
that the commercial speech doctrine should be abolished, and commercial speech granted 
full First Amendment protection, on the grounds that commercial speech is difficult to 
categorize and that there is no rationale for offering limited protection to truthful commer-
cial information. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 110.  
 146. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protec-
tion for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 
587, 589–91 (2000) (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)).  
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neutrality standard. In Sorrell, the Court addressed a Vermont statute that 
prohibited the sale, disclosure, and use of physician-identifying information 
by pharmacies and pharmaceutical manufacturers in their marketing activi-
ties.147 The Court found the statute in question, a regulation of commercial 
speech, to be content-based, because it would require an enforcement of-
ficer to determine whether the protected information was being used for 
marketing or for some other use.148 Sorrell is notable, however, because the 
Court stated explicitly—and did so multiple times throughout the opin-
ion—that speaker-based commercial speech regulations were essentially a 
form of content-based regulation,149 another departure from earlier hold-
ings, which seemingly endorsed some element of speaker-based regulation 
in the context of commercial speech.150 While some forms of speaker-based 
regulation were always constitutionally suspect,151 courts had also tolerated 
some degree of speaker-based regulation when the regulation was unrelated 
to the content of the message being conveyed.152 
                                                                                                                      
 147. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. The Vermont statute in question was designed to cut 
down on “detailing,” the process by which pharmacies sell information about doctors to 
pharmaceutical companies, who in turn use such information to gain advantage in their 
marketing tactics directed toward specific doctors. See id. at 2659–60. 
 148. See id. at 2663 (“[T]hose who wish to engage in certain ‘educational communica-
tions’ . . . may purchase the information. The measure then bars any disclosure when 
recipient speakers will use the information for marketing.”).  
 149. See, e.g., id. at 2665 (“Both on its face and in its practical operation, Vermont’s law 
imposes a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker.”). The 
Court explains the speaker-based problem with the Vermont law by showing that a certain 
group was singled out as being unable to obtain and use information about doctors, while 
other groups (i.e. non-detailers) could obtain and use the information. Id. at 2667. Although 
the Court was concerned about speaker-based regulation, the problem could have also easily 
been analyzed as an under-inclusivity problem. 
 150. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658–59 (1994) (plurality 
opinion). Speech regulations that were effectively speaker-based have been upheld in the 
context of outdoor sign regulations where the regulation imposed different speech regula-
tions based on the land use of the property where a particular business was located, see, e.g., 
Paradigm Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Irving, 65 F. App’x 509, at *3 (5th Cir. 2003), or even 
where the regulation differentiated among different industrial sectors’ ability to post out-
door signage, see G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 151. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) 
(plurality opinion) (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too 
often simply a means to control content.”). 
 152. See id. (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate 
to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allow-
ing governmental entities to perform their functions.”). The Supreme Court had previously 
suggested that speaker-based regulation was only suspect where the government had some 
preference or aversion to the message that the speaker was communicating. See Turner Broad. 
Sys., 512 U.S. at 658.  
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Thus, since Metromedia, there has been a gradual increase in the degree 
of content neutrality required of governmental regulations of speech. This 
gradual increase suggests that, to comply with the Supreme Court’s recent 
statements on content neutrality, the content neutrality requirement in sign 
regulation should be more stringent, instead of less stringent as desired by 
the context-sensitive and category-based schools. These pushes toward 
increased content neutrality and further sterilization of the government’s 
ability to pick and choose between different forms of speech suggest that 
the context-sensitive model for outdoor sign regulation has a limited future. 
B. Carve-outs from the Content Neutrality Doctrine: False Alarms 
Although the Supreme Court has firmly established the content neu-
trality requirement in its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has 
relented on some aspects of content review in speech regulation. This Part 
will discuss some of these aspects of content review, and will endorse the 
idea that, where the Court has permitted some degree of content review, it 
is inapplicable to sign regulation, and therefore sign regulation requires a 
strict degree of neutrality. Three “exceptions” to the rule on content neu-
trality, which have been used on occasion to support a context-sensitive or 
category-based approach to the principle, are discussed herein. 
1. Unprotected Speech: Obscenity and Fighting Words 
The Court has recognized that a limited number of cases and categories 
of speech fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, thus allowing 
the government to regulate such speech based on its content.153 These ex-
ceptions have been very limited and have been reserved for fighting 
words154 or obscene forms of speech.155 Furthermore, a lesser degree of First 
Amendment protection is afforded to speech that may have potentially 
                                                                                                                      
 153. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 154. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 155. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“[W]e recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic 
materials that some arguably artistic value, [but] it is manifest that society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude . . . . Even 
though the First Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, 
we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for 
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.”); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding speech to be obscene based on: “(a) whether ‘the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value” (citations omitted)). 
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damaging secondary effects on nearby people and communities.156 The 
Court’s analysis of these exceptions is not an undermining or carving-out of 
the content neutrality principle, but rather recognizes a limitation on the 
constitutional protection offered to certain forms of speech, based either on 
its content or the consequences of certain forms of content.157 In other 
words, if speech has the full protection of the First Amendment, it must be 
regulated in a content-neutral way. Furthermore, the Court has carefully 
noted that governments’ ability to engage in content review has become 
more limited, not more expansive over time,158 and forms of speech tradi-
tionally offered less constitutional protection have gained greater protection 
over time.159 While the Court recognized that the content of speech must at 
times be examined in order to determine whether speech is constitutionally 
protected,160 it has otherwise remained committed to its statements that 
reviewing content is off-limits. 
2. Metromedia Distinctions 
Courts that have adopted the context-sensitive or category-based ap-
proaches to sign regulation have done so on the grounds that Metromedia, 
by endorsing the on-premises/off-premises distinction,161 offers leeway for 
the creation of a more relaxed content neutrality standard.162 However, 
despite the confusion in Metromedia arising from the application of the 
content neutrality doctrine to the on-premises/off-premises distinction,163 
                                                                                                                      
 156. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (“[A]t least 
with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances de-
signed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed 
under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations.”).  
 157. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
 158. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.  
 159. The offering of greater constitutional protection to types of speech that tradition-
ally were afforded less protection is not limited only to obscene or explicit speech. See, e.g., 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
 160. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71–72. Young touches on the obvious limit to an absolutist 
application of the content neutrality doctrine described in footnote 101: the determination of 
whether an object constitutes speech of the type and nature protected by the First Amend-
ment may require at least a cursory examination of the object’s content. See id.  
 161. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
 162. See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1063 (1994). The Rappa court 
makes the further observation that the content-based exceptions in the law in question “are 
quite small,” and that “they are not for particular subjects likely to generate much debate and 
so are not likely to focus debate on that subject matter at the expense of other subject mat-
ter; and they do not discriminate by viewpoint.” Id. The Supreme Court has never suggested 
that the likelihood that the speech would be the subject of debate was of concern in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a speech regulation, and the Supreme Court has explicitly 
held that content neutrality is required in addition to viewpoint neutrality. See Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 163. See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 75. 
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the Metromedia opinions remained clear on the Court’s continued commit-
ment to an exacting degree of content neutrality.164 Even though the 
opinions were divided on whether the on-premises/off-premises (and com-
mercial/noncommercial) distinction contained in the San Diego ordinance 
in question violated the content neutrality doctrine,165 the Court did not 
hold in favor of a context-sensitive approach that would reject the founda-
tional doctrine of content neutrality.166 In fact, the plurality opinion does 
not suggest167 that the Court understood the on-premises/off-premises 
distinction to be a time, place, and manner distinction, as opposed to hav-
ing any bearing on content.168  
C. Signs as a Unique Mode of Expression 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that different modes of 
expression warrant different applications of First Amendment doctrine.169 
Supporters of the more relaxed content neutrality standard discussed above 
place heavy reliance on cases dealing with forms of expression outside of 
sign law, relying principally on Hill v. Colorado170 to support this position. 
Signs’ uniqueness as a mode of expression and the impracticality of reliance 
on Hill are discussed herein. 
Hill, which is one of the Supreme Court’s most recent articulations of 
the content neutrality standard, dealt with a Colorado statute that prohibit-
ed, in areas near the entrance to a health care facility, a person to approach 
within eight feet of another person without the consent of the other person 
for the purpose of engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.171 One 
of the challenges brought against the statute was that it was unconstitution-
ally content-based, on the grounds that an officer enforcing the statute 
                                                                                                                      
 164. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)) (“[T]he city may not choose the appropriate subjects for public 
discourse: ‘To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would 
be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.’ ” (emphasis added)). 
 165. Compare Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–13 (plurality opinion), with id. at 536 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); id. at 540–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); and id. at 559–61 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 166. Only Justice Brennan’s concurrence, id. at 528, and Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, 
id. at 565, suggested the possibility of a context-sensitive approach to sign regulation; this 
was not a majority of the Court. 
 167. See id. at 510–12; see also Mandelker, supra note 33, at 76–77. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See infra discussion in note 179. 
 170. 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 171. Id. at 707 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs in the case were a group of anti-
abortion protesters; the statute would have banned the protesters from approaching within 
eight feet of individuals receiving medical treatment, including abortions, outside abortion 
clinics. See id. at 708 (plurality opinion). 
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would sometimes be required to listen to the content of a person’s language 
in order to determine whether the person was engaging in oral protest.172 
The Court found that the statute was content neutral.173  
In determining that the regulation in Hill fit within the bounds of con-
tent neutrality required by the First Amendment, the Court observed—
somewhat oddly—that enforcing the statute in question would not neces-
sarily require the enforcing officer to listen to the words spoken to 
determine whether a speaker was approaching a listener for the purpose of 
engaging in oral protest.174 In addressing the issue of determining a speak-
er’s purpose in approaching a listener, however, the Court noted that it 
might be necessary for the enforcing officer to make a cursory review of the 
content of the speech, if only to determine that the speaker’s approach of 
the listener is regulated under the statute.175 This suggestion—that some 
review of content is permissible—motivates much of the context-sensitive 
and category-based approaches.176  
The more functional approaches to content neutrality misplace their 
reliance on Hill for a variety of reasons. Foremost among these reasons is 
the fact that application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hill, a case 
that dealt with oral communication,177 is inappropriate in the context of 
determining whether a municipal sign regulation is content based.178 While 
it would be inappropriate to suggest that courts determining the constitu-
tionality of a sign regulation should not consider First Amendment law as 
applied to other modes of communication, the concern over an oral speak-
er’s constitutional rights in Hill and the potential constitutional issues that 
                                                                                                                      
 172. See id. at 720. 
 173. Id. at 723–24 (observing that the statute “places no restrictions on—and clearly 
does not prohibit—either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed 
by a speaker . . . . Instead of drawing distinctions based on the subject that the approaching 
speaker may wish to address, the statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights 
activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries. Each can attempt to educate 
unwilling listeners on any subject, but without consent may not approach within eight feet 
to do so.”). 
 174. Id. at 721 (“With respect to the conduct that is the focus of the Colorado statute, 
it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in 
order to determine whether ‘sidewalk counselors’ are engaging in ‘oral protest, education, or 
counseling’ rather than pure social or random conversation.”). 
 175. Id. at 721–22. 
 176. See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622–23 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (upholding a city sign ordinance that distinguished among “advertising,” “busi-
ness,” and “political” signs based in large part on the subject matter of the signs); Covenant 
Media of S.C. v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Burt, 
supra note 81, at 523.  
 177. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707. 
 178. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981) 
(plurality opinion). 
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would arise from a municipal sign regulation are of a completely different 
nature.179  
The purpose of the statute at issue in Hill was to protect the privacy in-
terests of individuals receiving medical treatment; the concern was that 
such individuals would become “unwilling listeners” mobbed by protesters 
while entering or exiting a health care facility.180 In the case of a speaker 
and listener, as in Hill, two distinct individual rights are at odds with one 
another: the right of the speaker to express his or her views, and the right 
of the unwilling listener to maintain his or her privacy.181 The statute was, 
in essence, concerned with the speaker’s conduct or intent, because in order 
to fall under the auspices of the statute, the speaker would need to knowing-
ly approach within eight feet of the listener for the purpose of oral protest, 
education or counseling.182 The determination of the speaker’s purpose was 
thus critical to application of the statute in question: if the speaker were 
prohibited from speaking at all, he or she would be deprived of a First 
Amendment right, while if the speaker were authorized to speak with im-
punity, the listener’s right of privacy would be violated.183 As the Court 
noted, it could be possible to determine an oral speaker’s purpose in speak-
ing to another person based on such factors as the intonation of the  
speaker’s voice or the speaker’s manner of approaching the other person, 
but at times, it may also be necessary to undertake a cursory review of the 
speaker’s words to determine whether or not the statute applies to the 
speaker.184  
Signs are a different matter. There is almost no conceivable situation in 
which a sign affixed to the ground and regulated by a municipal sign ordi-
nance could possibly infringe upon an individual’s privacy interest in a 
fashion similar to that of an oral protester who knowingly approaches with-
in close range of another person. To protect the privacy interests of an 
individual while balancing an oral speaker’s countervailing interest in free 
                                                                                                                      
 179. In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
different modes of communication warrant different legal treatment, given the vast differ-
ences that exist between the modes and the implications of such differences for the potential 
deprivation of a speaker’s constitutional rights. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 (“Each 
method of communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the ‘differing 
natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each method.”) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 
557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment 
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (“Each method [of 
expression] tends to present its own peculiar problems.”). 
 180. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 718. 
 181. Id. at 714–16. 
 182. Id. at 707. 
 183. See id. at 718. 
 184. Id. at 721–22. 
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speech, the speaker’s purpose is a critical determination that may at times 
require a cursory review of the content of the speech, but this analysis is 
dramatically different in the context of sign regulation.185 First, the interest 
being protected counter to the sign owner’s First Amendment right is a 
public interest in traffic safety and environmental aesthetics, not an individ-
ual right of privacy. The purpose of a sign, as opposed to its physical 
characteristics, is largely irrelevant when the placement of the sign is being 
considered in light of its impact on the aesthetic character of a communi-
ty.186 For example, a sign can be regulated based on its face area, height, 
setback from street frontage, placement on the property where it is located, 
brightness of its lighting, or the materials used in the sign’s construction, all 
of which further the public’s aesthetic regulatory interest.187 No matter 
what the sign’s message, a large, bright sign could offend community aes-
thetics; on the other hand, a small, pleasantly-designed sign could further 
the aesthetic interest, despite a message that might be objectionable to 
some community members.188 None of the physical characteristics de-
scribed above, which form the central problem in aesthetic concerns, have 
anything to do with the message or subject matter of the speech. Further-
more, physical characteristics offer a much more definite and content-
neutral basis on which an enforcement official can enforce the sign ordi-
nance, as compared to regulating the manner in which an individual whose 
protesting activities may harm another individual. 
Moreover, a sign’s “conduct” is of a very different character than a 
speaker’s conduct. An oral speaker may either speak or not speak. If the 
First Amendment protects the oral speaker’s speech,189 then a regulator 
                                                                                                                      
 185. See id.  
 186. Of course, signs that contain content lying outside the boundaries First Amend-
ment protection and offensive to community morals, such as obscene words and images, 
would be possible to remove on the basis of their obscenity. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973). 
 187. See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2. 
 188. While it is perfectly true that the message of a sign often lays the groundwork for 
community outrage and subsequent regulation, any arguments that would support sign 
regulation on the basis of community disagreement must fail under the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). A line of cases has outlawed the “heckler’s 
veto,” whereby disagreement with a particular message is a proper basis for silencing it. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). The First Amendment itself was adopted out 
of the Framers’ concern that an unrestrained majority could silence or coerce minority 
groups, cutting them out of pluralist debate. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 189. Some speech falls outside the boundaries of the First Amendment because its 
particularly offensive or condemnable content may lead to immediate adverse and potential-
ly dangerous reactions by listeners or witnesses. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 34–35; 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919). 
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must also have some means by which to protect the constitutional rights of 
the listener if those rights are so implicated. Thus, the speaker’s intonation, 
physical actions, and purpose are the only constitutional bases upon which 
to regulate the speech without regulating based on content.190 On the other 
hand, a sign’s “conduct” can be far more easily described in terms of its 
physical characteristics, such as its size, height, placement, lighting and 
design.191 Additionally, although an enforcement officer could determine 
that a speaker was engaged in oral protest on the basis of the speaker’s 
intonation or manner of approach, none of the physical characteristics of 
signage, such as its size, height, placement, lighting or design, provide a 
similarly content-neutral opportunity to determine the sign’s purpose. On 
the contrary, the only way to determine that a sign is placed for oral protest 
is by reading its message. One would be hard-pressed to regulate signage 
based on its purpose without engaging in the type of content-based, sub-
ject-matter regulation that the Supreme Court has repeatedly proscribed.192 
The Supreme Court’s pre- and post-Metromedia statements on speech 
regulations and content neutrality do not qualify or limit the First 
Amendment’s demand for completely content-neutral sign regulations. The 
doctrine of content neutrality was developed without the suggestion that 
government would consistently need to make determinations on a message’s 
legality based on readings and analysis of its content. Metromedia confused 
the principle of complete content neutrality by endorsing distinctions be-
tween on-premises and off-premises signage, and commercial and 
noncommercial signage, which may be characterized as inherently content-
based distinctions. Although Hill endorsed an occasional cursory review of 
content to determine whether speech was covered by a particular regula-
tion, the case confused the doctrine, and the holding cannot be extended to 
sign regulation because of the vast disparities between oral communication 
and fixed and written outdoor materials. 
D. Erosion of the Content Neutrality Principle 
Under the Relaxed Approaches 
Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the context-sensitive and catego-
ry-based approaches is the possibility for erosion of the content neutrality 
doctrine itself, to the detriment of the First Amendment rights of individu-
al sign owners and speakers generally. To illustrate the basis for this concern 
requires a brief review of the purposes behind the First Amendment and 
                                                                                                                      
 190. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 721 (explaining that speech can constitutionally be 
regulated based on purpose). 
 191. See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 70–71. 
 192. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 723.  
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the content neutrality doctrine generally, as articulated throughout the 
history of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The Framers of the Constitution viewed the First Amendment and its 
guarantee of freedom of speech as fundamental to the functioning of a 
democratic government.193 Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized 
that more speech, not less, is central to the creation of civil discourse194 and 
that a society informed through speech has a greater likelihood of promot-
ing a free democracy than a society in which speech and information are 
suppressed.195 Therefore, the Supreme Court has taken pains to maintain 
that freedom, even while recognizing that some elements of speech and 
expression may be less worthy of constitutional protection since such ele-
ments are not integral to democratic government.196 The Supreme Court 
has struck down laws that have the effects of coercing speech,197 censoring 
speech,198 and chilling speech,199 as well as laws that allow administrative 
discretion as to the legality of speech200 and that effect outright suppression 
of speech.201 
To maintain the essential freedom guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, the Court has recognized that government regulation of content 
would open up a strong possibility that speech would be chilled, coerced, or 
suppressed.202 In Mosley, the Court said:  
                                                                                                                      
 193. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 194. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment affords 
the broadest protection to . . . political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ ” 
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[The 
Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech 
and assembly discussion would be futile.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–13 
(1969). 
 196. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34–35 (1972) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (fighting words); Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (incitements to violence).  
 197. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 198. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 199. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 
(1958); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) 
 200. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
 201. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931).  
 202. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (“[N]othing in our precedents suggests that a 
State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.”); 
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (“[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid 
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To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and 
to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guar-
anteed the right to express any thought, free from government 
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content 
control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its con-
tent would completely undercut the “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”203 
Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes that an exacting degree of content 
neutrality is a linchpin in the flourishing of open, democratic govern-
ment.204  
Given these motivations behind the content neutrality principle, it is 
clear that the functional approaches to sign regulation carry the significant 
likelihood of an erosion of the First Amendment rights of individual sign 
owners. By giving a government official or entity the opportunity to make a 
determination that some signs are more important than others at particular 
locations, the Rappa framework allows the content of a sign’s message to be 
scrutinized to the extent that a speaker may be barred from the exercise of 
his or her constitutional rights on vague grounds.205 Furthermore, a catego-
ry-based approach offers further opportunity for government to censor 
speech based on its content; an ordinance that makes special provisions for 
political signs requires government officials to make determinations as to 
what constitutes political speech. It is precisely these examples of govern-
ment discretion that the content neutrality principle, and by incorporation 
the First Amendment, have endeavored to avoid.206  
While the environmental and aesthetic concerns that undergird much 
of outdoor sign regulation are valid concerns, the First Amendment rights 
guaranteed to individuals are central to the proper functioning of a democ-
                                                                                                                      
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
cess.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 189, 217 (1983) (explaining the debate-distorting impact of content-based 
regulations). 
 203. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 204. The Supreme Court has maintained its stance that any content bias in govern-
ment regulations of speech carries the possibility of infringement upon core First 
Amendment rights, and thus may trample upon one of the hallmarks of the American 
democratic system. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534–35 
(1980). 
 205. See Melrose v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 384 (2010). An administrative 
official’s determination between an advertising sign, business sign, or identification sign in 
Melrose could have made the difference in a business owner’s being able to place a sign on 
her premises. 
 206. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95–96. 
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racy. The Constitution does not place environmental protection efforts 
through outdoor sign regulation above the guaranteed rights of individuals 
to self-expression; accommodation of the individual right to free expression 
must therefore be made if sign regulations are to be found constitutional. 
This Part has thus demonstrated that the context-sensitive and catego-
ry-based approaches to content neutrality are improper given the Supreme 
Court’s precedent and the historical trajectory toward greater content neu-
trality. This conclusion is further dictated by the fact that the Supreme 
Court has reserved very limited carve-outs to the neutrality principle, 
largely saved for cases in which a regulator must determine whether the 
speech in question falls under the protection of the First Amendment. 
Finally, the context-sensitive and category-based approaches run the sub-
stantial risk of eroding the First Amendment rights of sign owners, which 
is intolerable even in light of the valid public interests implicated in aes-
thetic regulation. 
IV. THE STRICT APPROACH TO CONTENT NEUTRALITY: 
DEMANDED BY PRACTICAL NECESSITY 
Practical considerations for sign regulation, including improved envi-
ronmental aesthetic integrity in the long run, demand a clearer neutrality 
standard, applied to outdoor sign regulation, that does not waver in its 
application of the content neutrality principle. The notion that a more 
vigorous content neutrality requirement in sign regulation would provide 
greater protection for the aesthetic quality of the environment is admittedly 
backward-seeming, given that the litigation strategy of the billboard com-
panies is to routinely demand greater neutrality while local governments 
rely on relaxed interpretations of the content neutrality principle to deny 
sign permit applications.207 The fact remains, however, that billboard com-
panies and sign owners use content neutrality as the crux of their First 
Amendment claims because sign regulations are quite frequently not con-
tent neutral, creating an easy argument to block enforcement of a sign 
ordinance.208 There exists a widespread mistaken belief that content-based 
sign regulations are the only means by which communities can accomplish 
their aesthetic goals. This belief exists because it is conceptually easier to 
identify and regulate problems with intuitive but content-based regula-
                                                                                                                      
 207. Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 8. 
 208. Billboard plaintiffs generally argue in favor of a very stringent “need to read” 
approach to sign regulation, which goes beyond the approach being advocated in this Note. 
Id. It would be completely impossible to require a “need to read” approach, because it would 
then preclude governmental officials from even determining whether a sign is truly a sign; 
however, avoiding a “need to read” approach does not necessarily bring the content neutrali-
ty determination into a context-sensitive approach. 
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tions—such as a community with a political sign proliferation problem 
simply restricting the timeframe when political signs may be displayed209—
instead of using a more content-neutral form of regulation. Governments 
are thus boxed into the corner of defending ordinances that regulate on the 
basis of subject matter, and must hide behind arguments in favor of the 
context-sensitive approach to the First Amendment in order to protect 
their laws from being struck down.210 
The relaxed content neutrality approaches to reviewing outdoor sign 
regulations frequently benefit government regulators, since the common 
result of a context-sensitive or category-based review of a sign ordinance is 
the upholding of the ordinance.211 Thus, governments and environmental-
ists have cheered on the courts taking a less hard-line approach to the 
content neutrality requirement of the First Amendment, under the mistak-
en impression that a more relaxed content neutrality analysis will benefit 
their cause. And in fact, a more relaxed content neutrality analysis has 
given immediate benefit to the cause of government and the pro-regulatory 
community. But these immediate benefits are pyrrhic victories; with them 
has come long-term uncertainty and a legacy of vague boundaries as to the 
degree of content that governments may regulate,212 leaving open the dis-
tinct possibility for additional sign industry challenges to sign regulations 
further down the road. These victories have come at high litigation costs to 
local governments, and environmental advocacy organizations have commit-
ted significant resources in litigation to support the regulatory efforts of 
                                                                                                                      
 209. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54 F.3d 1400 (1995). There are 
numerous other examples of local governments employing “intuitive” but content-based 
approaches to sign problems. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 
(1981) (plurality opinion) (striking down a general ban on off-premises billboards that was 
intended address a billboard proliferation problem); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune 
Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (striking down sign regulations that created content-
based exemptions); Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (1993) (striking down an 
exemption for “governmental” flags in an ordinance that otherwise prohibited flags); State v. 
DeAngelo, 963 A.2d 1200 (N.J. 2009) (striking down an ordinance that prohibited inflatable 
and portable signs, with limited exceptions). 
 210. See, e.g., Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 1998); Whitton, 54 
F.3d at 1403; Fehribach v. City of Troy, 341 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 211. See, e.g., Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 383, 389–90 (3d Cir. 
2010); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622–25 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 753–54 (3d Cir. 2007); Wheeler v. Comm’r of High-
ways, 822 F.2d 586, 589–90 (6th Cir. 1987). Note that the approach taken in Rappa did not 
actually benefit the defendant state, since a portion of the regulation was struck down on 
other grounds. See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1068 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 212. See Trevarthen, supra note 68, at 8. The instability of the federal courts’ treatment 
of content neutrality has contributed to the problem, providing little to no guidance on the 
actual degree of content neutrality required of local regulations. Id. 
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local governments that employ some obviously content-based distinctions 
in their sign ordinances.213  
The practical argument for a clearer content neutrality requirement is 
thus straightforward: as long as governments believe they can get away with 
content-based distinctions in their ordinances, content-based sign regula-
tions will continue to be challenged in the courts. The lack of certainty over 
the requirements of content neutrality will continue to result in many ordi-
nances being struck down. A clearer content neutrality regime, even if it 
imposes more rigorous up-front requirements on ordinance drafters, will 
provide certainty to regulators, encourage governments to more carefully 
navigate their First Amendment duties, and will dramatically reduce the 
cost and quantity of litigation directed at governments—particularly mu-
nicipalities—throughout the country. Furthermore, governments’ 
regulatory goals can be accomplished under the stricter content neutrality 
regime; a context-sensitive approach is not required to achieve a desired 
community character.214 
The need for more certain judicial direction to guide local sign regula-
tors is illustrated by the direction given by courts that have advocated 
context-sensitive or category-based approaches. For example, the Rappa 
context-sensitive approach, by allowing government officials to determine 
the relative importance of signage at particular locations,215 appears to grant 
significant administrative discretion over the subject matter of the sign. 
The decision does not provide any decipherable standard for determining 
the relative “importance” of a sign; determination of importance almost 
certainly requires an analysis of the sign’s content. Who is to say, for exam-
ple, that a political sign would be more important than an address sign in a 
residential area?216 This argument parrots a First Amendment “vagueness” 
                                                                                                                      
 213. Scenic America has sided with municipal regulators on a significant amount of 
billboard litigation, including, most recently, Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 
644 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2011); the organization has filed amicus curiae briefs in numerous 
other cases. See generally SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org (last visited on Sept. 6, 2012). 
Scenic America receives most of its litigation resources pro bono, but the organization’s 
Executive Director estimates that it has spent a billable-hour equivalent of over $2 million 
in recent years, and that some of the organization’s state-based affiliates have spent in excess 
of $1 million on litigation in recent years. E-mail from Mary Tracy, Executive Director, 
Scenic America, to author (Apr. 29, 2012, 10:46 EST) (on file with author). 
 214. See generally MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, at 48–75 (proposing a model 
ordinance which is entirely content neutral, yet accomplishes the regulatory goals of a model 
community). 
 215. Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064. 
 216. A similar problem arose in Melrose where the city ordinance attempted to distin-
guish between “advertising,” “business,” and “identification” signs; an identification sign 
allowed the display of the name of an individual or organization located at the premises, 
while a business sign was one that “directs attention to a business, organization, profession 
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or “prior restraint” argument, but both of these concepts are inherently 
related to the problem of content neutrality; if the regulation is unconstitu-
tionally vague, it almost certainly will authorize an administrative official to 
discriminate against certain messages based on content or viewpoint.217 
Thus, the Rappa model opens new questions that it does not answer, leaving 
local governments to engage in guesswork to determine whether their find-
ings of the importance of certain subjects of speech sufficiently meet the 
standard.  
A category-based approach to content neutrality raises similar uncer-
tainties. A common local ordinance provision provides special regulations 
for “political signs,” and courts that have accepted a category-based ap-
proach have upheld these special regulations.218 Again, however, upholding 
such category-based regulations leaves open a variety of questions about 
how signs might be categorized. For example, it may be somewhat obvious 
that the category of political signs includes signage related to an individu-
al’s candidacy for elected office. But does a store window posting of a 
newspaper cartoon featuring a likeness of an elected official constitute 
political speech? Furthermore, to what level of abstraction in the broader 
taxonomy of sign types might such categories constitutionally go? Could 
regulations of political signs be broken out into “election” signs relating to a 
specific election and “advocacy” signs relating to a general political philoso-
phy or theory? Does a political sign placed by a corporate entity even fall 
under the broader umbrella of “noncommercial” speech? The courts have 
not provided sufficient definition on any of these points, thus leaving local 
governments to feel their way toward a constitutional sign regulation under 
the category-based approach. 
Meanwhile, an alternative framework that relies on a strict content 
neutrality standard leaves few questions; even if it does not completely 
resolve the uncertainty, such an approach can give local governments much 
greater confidence in their regulatory approaches.219 Examples of govern-
ment entities that enacted ordinances lacking in category-based or context-
sensitive distinctions, and that had those ordinances treated favorably by 
                                                                                                                      
or industry located upon the premises where the sign is displayed . . . .” Melrose, 613 F.3d at 
384. The Court upheld the ordinance, following its earlier holding in Rappa. Id. at 383.  
 217. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[I]t is largely because gov-
ernmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution 
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”). 
 218. See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 219. See ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, INC. & D.B. HARTT, INC., A FRAMEWORK FOR ON-
PREMISE SIGN REGULATIONS 15 (2009) (“When local governments enact sign regulations 
that are entirely—or even predominantly—content-neutral, courts have little difficulty 
upholding the regulations against a legal challenge.”). 
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courts, are numerous.220 Courts in these cases have demanded a high degree 
of content neutrality that has a clear direction and comprehensible stand-
ards to municipal ordinance drafters, providing models for other 
municipalities to emulate in the ordinance drafting processes.221 By requir-
ing sign regulations to abide by the content-neutral “time, place, and 
manner” standards, little flexibility is left for government to regulate on the 
basis of content, thus deterring litigation.  
Those courts and authors advocating a functional approach to content 
neutrality frequently do so under the guise that a municipality would be 
unable to achieve its aesthetic or other regulatory goals under a stricter 
content neutrality regime, or that a less stringent regime would be more 
“workable.”222 This suggestion is false, as demonstrated by the fact that a 
number of commentators,223 and an increasing number of communities 
throughout the nation, have developed sign regulations that approach com-
plete content neutrality.224 There is hardly a sign regulation problem faced 
by a municipality today that cannot be addressed with a content-neutral 
solution.225 This fact alone undercuts the argument that a local government 
would be unable to achieve its regulatory purposes without the added help 
                                                                                                                      
 220. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 
2010); Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2009); Covenant Media of S.C., LLC 
v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007); La Tour v. City of Fayetteville, Ark., 
442 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2006); Am. Legion Post 7 v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 (4th 
Cir. 2001). Note that many of these cases still dealt with ordinances that contained the 
troubled commercial/noncommercial and on-/off-premises distinctions. 
 221. See, e.g., G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1071, 1077–78 (upholding a municipal 
ordinance that, among other things, banned “pole signs” on the grounds that the “restriction 
[was] not a ‘law[] that by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored speech from disfavored speech 
on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.’ ” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 643 (1994))). The court also upheld a provision for “event signs” on the basis that 
an event sign regulation did not relate to the content of the sign, but rather to a temporal 
limitation on the display of signs during and around times of events. G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 
F.3d at 1077; see also Am. Legion Post 7, 239 F.3d at 608 (upholding a city ordinance that 
restricted the size of flags that could be displayed; the court specifically stated that regula-
tion of size of a display is a content-neutral mode of regulation). 
 222. See ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, INC. & D.B. HARTT, INC., supra note 219, at 15–16. 
 223. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 33, at 79 (discussing the way in which a sign 
regulation can avoid the on-premises/off-premises distinction); see also MANDELKER ET AL., 
supra note 14; ANDREW D. BERTUCCI & RICHARD B. CRAWFORD, U.S. SIGN COUNCIL, 
MODEL ON-PREMISE SIGN CODE 7 (2011), available at http://www.usscfoundation.org/ 
USSCModelOn-PremiseSignCode.pdf. 
 224. A number of municipalities throughout the nation have adopted completely 
content-neutral ordinances, including Melbourne, Florida; Mesa, Arizona; and West Holly-
wood, California. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Ordinances, LAND USE L., http://law.wustl.edu/ 
landuselaw/ordinances.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
 225. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, at 47–75 (providing a model sign ordi-
nance); see also CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2 (review of numerous 
content-neutral options for dealing with common local sign regulation issues). 
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of courts employing a less-stringent content neutrality standard226 that 
would potentially infringe upon First Amendment rights and expose the 
municipality to litigation. For example, a municipality could easily have 
regulations limiting the height, size, materials, and lighting of signage—and 
still maintain an attractive character—with no mention of message in the 
ordinance.227 
Thus, practical aspects of sign regulation—reduction of litigation risk 
and assurance of continued enforceability of sign ordinances—provide 
cause enough alone for more consistent application of the content neutrali-
ty principle by the courts. Regulatory certainty and the fact that content-
based regulations are unnecessary to the achievement of aesthetic character 
goals provide sufficient grounds for a more rigorous content neutrality 
analysis. As long as courts are willing to provide flexibility in the content 
neutrality standard, governments—particularly municipalities—will be 
willing and able to forget the First Amendment requirements placed upon 
them in their regulatory capacity. There is significant opportunity for coex-
istence between the First Amendment rights of individual sign owners to 
post their desired messages and the protection of the aesthetic environmen-
tal interests of communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Governments—particularly at the local level—have relied heavily on 
context-sensitive and category-based regulations to accomplish their aes-
thetic regulatory goals under the assumption that creating a visual  
environment free of noxious signage would be impossible without some 
degree of content regulation. However, these regulations have fallen prey to 
sign owners and billboard companies seeking to exercise their First 
Amendment rights to post and display speech. The practice of employing 
context-sensitive or category-based regulations, which has been endorsed by 
some courts as sufficiently within the realm of constitutional regulation, 
continues to carry significant legal risk and attract costly litigation. Em-
ploying such risky strategies for regulating signage leaves open the 
possibility that local sign ordinances will be struck down, thus creating a 
regulatory vacuum in which signs and billboards could be placed with im-
punity; such an outcome would be destructive for the local visual 
environment. This Note offers support for a speech regulation jurispru-
dence that uniformly applies a strict standard of content neutrality without 
exception, because such an approach would create a more consistent regula-
                                                                                                                      
 226. See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1064 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 227. See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2. 
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tory environment that would leave governments less exposed to litigation 
and lessen the potential for aesthetic and environmental degradation. 
Requiring governments to comply with the strictest demands of con-
tent neutrality instead of fishing for the proper level of content neutrality 
under the context-sensitive and category-based approaches would produce 
significantly greater predictability for regulators, which would lead to 
greater certainty in aesthetic protection efforts. Although governments 
have been forced to deal with challenges by sign plaintiffs who have taken 
on the more literal view of content neutrality in order to strike down sign 
regulations, municipal compliance with the more literal view provides the 
most sound answer to these challenges. The non-necessity of content-based 
distinctions to achieve almost any sign control goals undermines arguments 
that the content neutrality doctrine should be more flexible. Even though a 
more literal content neutrality jurisprudence would impose greater de-
mands on municipal regulators to design truly content-neutral ordinances, 
it would provide a reliable standard for local regulators and sign owners. 
And in the long run, such an approach would clear up the confusion that 
has developed because of circuit splits and the courts’ seemingly flexible 
approach to the First Amendment’s content neutrality requirement. 
